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I analyze the price discovery, liquidity provision, and transaction-cost components driven by 
the real-time firm-specific news at the Paris Bourse. I find that the news impact depends on 
which type of news bulletin is released. Only news items causing extreme price disruptions 
such as earnings announcements enlarge spreads and information asymmetry risk. In contrast, 
the greater part of real-time firm-specific news releases is a magnet for liquidity and trading. 
This research provides insights into the market quality of limit-order book markets in which 
liquidity provision dynamically adapts to market conditions and information events. Limit order 
traders sustain liquidity even when facing extreme news impacts. 
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How does the real-time release of firm-specific news characterize the order flow and trading 
activity? Do information releases deteriorate or improve market liquidity? How does a market 
structure based on voluntary liquidity provision accommodate information events? Do 
submitters of limit orders demand more compensation to provide liquidity during the price 
revision process? Are news announcements preceded or followed by information asymmetry? 
Are extreme price changes driven by news arrivals associated with an illiquid market or with an 
extraordinary demand for liquidity? I address these fundamental questions in this paper.  
A distinguishing characteristic of my study concerns the type and timing of news items. 
Using the Reuters alert system, I collect six months of firm-specific alerts for 30 highly liquid 
French stocks. Previous studies focused on specific cases of anticipated information 
disclosures, such as earnings, dividend, or macroeconomic news announcements. Instead, my 
research embraces all firm-specific news items that are routed in real-time to the traders’ 
trading screens. The Reuters alerts system has been already used in the previous literature but 
only partially or with a lower extent of precision. Some studies used it to extract only specific 
news items (e.g. earnings announcements). Others clustered all news categories together to 
measure the aggregate market impact (e.g. Berry and Howe, 1994; Mitchell and Mulherin, 
1994). Here I examine the entire flow of firm-specific news releases in a finer detail. The 
benefits of this kind of information flow are twofold. First, it represents the relevant 
information set that characterizes a trader’s decisions. The firm-specific news alert system 
covers all the pertinent aspects influencing the firm’s value, such as its core business, its 
competitors and sectors, all valuable trading information (e.g. information officially released by 
the company, interviews, press digest, analysts’ research, etc.), and all market and corporate 
information (e.g. market index compositions, issuance of corporate bonds or new securities, 
mergers and acquisitions, etc.). Second, firm-specific news alerts represent the actual real-time 
information flow monitored by traders. The technology implies a continuous monitoring of   3
news and order flows. The pervasive presence of day-traders looking for stale orders compels 
limit-order submitters to update their quotes continuously. The so-called “SOES bandits” at the 
NASDAQ represent an indicative example
1. However, short-term trading strategies need to be 
continuously revised on the basis of the incoming order flow and news arrivals. My research 
provides insights into the dynamic relations between the real-time news and order flows. Part of 
the previous literature shows that traders actively monitor and promptly react to the real-time 
information flow. My research attempts to go one step further by showing the different patterns 
of the market response. 
Considerable effort has so far been devoted to analyzing the market impact of earnings 
and dividend announcements. I also analyze the minute-by-minute market reaction to real-time 
earnings announcements. My results are essentially consistent with the previous literature. 
However, by contrasting the market impact of earnings announcements and other firm-specific 
news arrivals, two major points emerge. First, the whole information flow, and not just earnings 
announcements, has a significant market impact. Second, and more importantly, typical real-
time firm-specific news and earnings announcements characterize trading in opposing ways. 
While the latter widens the spread and volatility as widely documented in the literature, the 
former attracts both liquidity and trading. These results suggest that liquidity providers 
promptly recognize and efficiently react to the information content of the real-time new release. 
When the piece of news conveys no major contents, they compete with one another in 
undercutting and overbidding strategies that result in a thinner spread and larger market depth. 
When the information release impacts more severely onto prices, a sharp price adjustment 
demands an immediate execution for greater trading volumes that absorb market liquidity. Even 
in extreme price disruptions, however, new limit orders fill the book and liquidity supply 
                                                 
1 The NASDAQ’s small execution system (SOES) allows brokerage firms to execute small orders automatically at 
the best quotes. Although this was intended for retail investors, SOES mainly attracted day traders called SOES   4
remains elevated. Thus, my findings suggest a dynamic adaptation of liquidity provision along 
with market conditions and the real-time information flow. 
Theoretically, a liquid market ensures that trades of any volume size will be executed 
immediately and without price impact. In practice, if there is uncertainty regarding asset values, 
market liquidity could collapse. This is an especially relevant issue for market structures 
without designated market makers who assure liquidity provision to the market. In this respect, 
the market microstructure of the Paris Bourse represents an insightful subject to study. 
Although market structures and trading platforms similar to those of the Paris Bourse have been 
used elsewhere globally, little research has been devoted to understanding how these markets 
assimilate information events. There are seminal papers that empirically analyze limit order 
book markets (e.g. Biais, Hillion and Spatt, 1995; Hamao and Hasbrouck, 1995; Ahn, Bae and 
Chan, 2001; Sandås, 2001; Hollifield, Miller and Sandås, 2004; just to mention few of them). 
But there is little literature on how electronic limit order book markets respond to information 
events and, in particular, to extreme price disruptions. My study attempts to fill this gap in two 
ways: by analyzing the market behavior around the real-time information arrivals; and by 
examining the resistance of this market structure to news arrivals with an extreme impact. 
Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004) show that the liquidity drain after the circuit break at the NYSE 
on October 27, 1997, was mainly due to the limit-order traders’ reluctance to provide liquidity. 
My findings show that even when information disclosures engender extreme price disruptions, 
limit-order submitters in a pure limit-order book market actively sustain market liquidity. In so 
doing, this research provides insights into the viability and market quality of limit-order book 
markets.  
How the information is incorporated in the asset prices is a central issue in finance, 
particularly for the concepts of market efficiency. Market efficiency requires that information 
                                                                                                                                                           
bandits looking for profitable short-term opportunities represented by stale quotes.   5
be publicly available and that prices adjust immediately to market news. My study analyzes the 
price discovery process and information asymmetry risk around the release of firm-specific 
news. To do this, I propose a structural model for the estimation of the transaction-cost 
components that concerns price discreteness and yet is sensitive to the protracted effects of the 
trade process. This model expands on some of the existing price formation models based on 
autoregressive process of the order flow, in particular on the model by Madhavan, Richardson, 
and Roomans (1997). The estimation of transaction-cost components around public information 
arrivals shows few adverse selection problems and no additional liquidity supplier’s 
compensation. These cost components, however, increase surrounding news disclosures with an 
extreme impact. 
Although there is a large consensus in the literature about a quick price reaction to 
information arrivals, previous research provides conflicting evidence on the liquidity response. 
Several papers find that information events tend to deteriorate market liquidity (e.g. Lee, 
Mucklow, and Ready, 1993), but other studies find that liquidity remains essentially unchanged 
(e.g. Brooks, 1994; Morse and Ushman, 1983). Others again provide evidence that the market 
response to information disclosures depends on different aspects, such as the characteristics of 
the news bulletin and the market structure. The role of public information disclosures is also 
controversial from a theoretical perspective. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) propose a model in 
which anticipated public information stimulates informed judgments among traders who 
process public disclosure into private information. Thus, a public information announcement 
prompts market makers to increase the bid-ask size and decreases market liquidity at 
announcement dates. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), meanwhile, show that public disclosure 
improves the adverse selection problem. This implies that the market becomes more liquid at 
the time of a public announcement. To some extent, my study reconciles these opposing views. 
I find that only information disclosures which imply severe price adjustments, such as earnings   6
announcements, reduce market liquidity and, more specifically, enlarge the spread size. In 
contrast, the greater part of real-time firm-specific news releases in limit-order book markets 
elicits a higher liquidity provision by narrowing spreads and enlarging market depth.  
The paper proceeds as follows: section 1 describes the main features of the market 
structure of Paris Bourse and the dataset. Section 2 provides a literature survey. Section 3 gives 
a descriptive analysis of the news impact. Section 4 presents the model for the cost components 
measurement. Section 5 reports the empirical findings. Section 6 concludes. 
 
1. Dataset and Market Microstructure 
1.1 STRUCTURE OF THE PARIS BOURSE 
In 1986, the Paris Bourse introduced a fully automated trading system. After this structural 
change, the Paris Bourse grew impressively. In 1999, the yearly number of trades was 59 
million and the total stock market capitalization was around €723 billion (Parisbourse, 1999). 
At the end of 1999, the total market capitalization of the Paris Bourse was slightly higher than 
the German market, about half that of its London counterpart, and less than an eighth of the 
NYSE market value. 
The market structure of the Paris Bourse is based on a centralized electronic market with 
the limit-order book publicly visible. The French stock exchange is an order-driven market
2. 
Some traders voluntarily offer liquidity by filling the order book with limit orders. To 
compensate liquidity providers, traders who demand an immediate buy (sell) trade at a 
relatively higher (lower) price, i.e. the ask (bid) quotes. The difference between bid and ask 
quotes represents the liquidity provider's gross profit, i.e., their compensation for bearing 
                                                 
2 Designated market makers operate only for less liquid stocks. The market for CAC40 stocks is fully order-
driven.   7
inventory and adverse selection risks, brokerage commissions, communication costs, clearing, 
and other factors.  
The market opens at 9:00 a.m. and closes at 5:30 p.m. Trading takes place on a 
continuous basis. Traders may submit limit orders (à cour limité) indicating the highest (lowest) 
price at which they are willing to buy (sell). Otherwise, traders may immediately transact two 
types of market orders: an order at the market price (au prix du marché) or at any price (à tout 
prix). The main principle of the order book is the price-time priority rule. 
For highly traded stocks, limit-order traders constantly update the limit-order book (e.g. 
Bias, Hillion, and Spatt, 1995). The information in the limit-order book is publicly available 
and disseminated worldwide. In fact, real-time information is routed to more than 500,000 
terminals. Of the submitted orders, 44% come from overseas terminal traders (Parisbourse, 
2000). Only institutional agents and investment firms, called trading members, are authorized 
to submit orders in the Paris Bourse system. Nevertheless, orders can also be gathered by 
intermediaries – called order collectors – who then transmit such orders to trading members. 
The information in the limit-order book is visible on the trading screen for each stock. 
The information comprises the security symbol; the number of shares traded since the opening; 
the price changes between the last trade and the previous day’s close; the number of shares 
exchanged and the price and time stamp of the most recent five trades; and the limit price, 
number of orders, cumulated order size, and time stamp for the five highest bid and five lowest 
ask quotes.  
Table 1 should be inserted here 
 
1.B DATABASE 
The database provides time stamp, price, and volumes size of all trades, and time stamp,   8
cumulated order size, and price quotes of the prevailing bid and ask quotes. Limit orders other 
than the best quotes are not considered in this research. 
Matching between trade and order data allows me to reconstruct the state of the limit 
order book before, after, and during the trades. I reconstruct the sequence of the best order 
changes and trade executions for a six-month period from April to September 1999. This 
sample period includes 2,592,565 trades and it is a representative period after the introduction 
of the Euro. One may question if this period is biased by a positive trend (from April to 
September 1999, the CA40 index increased by 8%). My sample is not exposed to this criticism. 
Almost half of the stocks in my sample had a negative performance or their prices remained 
essentially unchanged. 
I analyze 30 highly traded stocks quoted on the Premier Marché, i.e. the market for large 
French and foreign companies with a market capitalization at least of €750 million and 25%of 
capital publicly available. These 30 stocks are components of the CAC 40 index. For each 
stock, Table 1 reports the name, market capitalization, price change over the sample period, 
average daily number of trades, and average daily trading volume. This table shows that the 
stocks in my sample are extremely liquid. In fact, the average daily number of trades and the 
daily turnover are similar to the NYSE sample analyzed by Venkataraman (2001). 
Table 1 also reports the average values of the time-weighted quoted bid-ask spread. I 
denote the prevailing ask and the bid quotes at time t as  t A  and  t B.   () 2 / B A M t t t + =  is the 
corresponding midquote price in t, and  ( ) t t t B A QS − =  is the quoted spread. The spread is a 
rough measure of the gross profit for providing liquidity, or, in other words, the cost of a round-
trip trade. Table 1 shows the difference in the quoted spread across stocks, starting from a 
minimum of €0.036 for the Usinor stock to a maximum of €1.219 for the Promodes stock. The 
percentage relative spread (PRS) is a standardized measure of the quoted spreads,   9
t t t M / QS PRS = . The largest and smallest values of the PRS are 0.305 and 0.127 respectively. 
The spread statistics in my sample are in line with the previous literature
3.  
Table 1 also describes the sample of firm-specific news gathered through the alert system 
of the Reuters 2000 service. A user can request that the Reuters alert system be notified for 
eight news categories: all alerts, general, political, market, economic, industrial, corporate, and 
firm-specific news. In this study, I consider only firm-specific news alerts. Thus, I was able to 
request notification of firm-specific news for the 30 stocks in my sample and the CAC 40 
index. From April to September 1999, I recorded date, time stamp, and news headlines for a 
total of more than 4,900 firm-specific news releases.  
I analyze only news announcements during the trading day. Whenever a news bulletin is 
reiterated, I consider only the first release. To detect repetitions, I check if news releases have 
the same headlines. There are two categories of firm-specific news: index-related news and 
strictly firm-specific news. Since all the 30 stocks in my sample are members of the CAC 40 
index, the Reuters alert system also acknowledges index-related news updates as firm-specific 
information releases. By activating the alert system for the CAC 40 index, I infer when news 
primarily refers to the French index.  
Figure 1 shows that the trading at the Paris Bourse is more intense at the opening, closing, 
and around the pre-opening and opening of the US future and stock markets, which occur at 
around 2:30 and 3:30 p.m. Paris time. Figure 2 shows that index-related news releases follow a 
similar intraday pattern. In fact, much of the index-related information corresponds to a news 
bulletin of index reactions to earlier events, such as the Paris Bourse or NYSE openings. Berry 
and Howe (1994) find a similar intraday seasonality looking at an aggregate measure of public 
information flow. Ederington and Lee (1993) show that scheduled macroeconomic news 
                                                 
3 See e.g., Declerck (2002) and de Jong, Nijman, and Röell (1996) for the Paris Bourse; Bessembinder and 
Kaufman (1997) for the NYSE.   10
releases mostly cause the intraday volatility patterns. My findings suggest that after removing 
index-related news from the firm-specific information flow, this kind of intraday seasonality is 
less marked. Throughout this paper, I analyze only the market reaction to strictly firm-specific 
news. This focus is consistent with my main research aim and allows me to avoid the intraday 
seasonalities that affect index-related news arrivals. 
Table 1 shows the number of firm-specific, index-related, and total news releases for each 
stock. Total releases are 1,031 index-related bulletins and 3,898 firm-specific news items. 
There is a wide disparity in the number of news releases in the sample. For instance, only 12 
releases referred to Legrand, but 677 referred to Elf. Table 1 also shows the exact time stamp of 
the 30 earnings announcements analyzed later in this study
4. I decided to study this specific 
information item for three main reasons: first, it represents the typical information event 
analyzed in the literature. Second, the comparison between my results and those in the previous 
literature provides a robustness check. Third, the identification of earnings announcements is 
relatively objective and precise. The earnings announcements listed in table 1 were singled out 
by searching the pertinent bulletins among all the Reuters firm-specific news alerts of each 
company. The earnings announcement selected for analysis is the earliest announcement time. 
Table 2 shows a typical intraday bulletin on France Telecom provided by the Reuters 
alert system. Out of the 11 news releases, 3 refer to index performance; the typical reaction of 
the French market to the US market opening. Instead, strictly firm-specific news is closely 
linked to the firm’s core business and competitors. In the examples in Table 2, several news 
releases refer to rumors of mergers and acquisitions between France Telecom’s competitors. 
                                                 
4 Earnings announcements are strictly regulated by the “The Autorité des marchés financiers” (AMF), that is the 
regulatory authority for the French markets. As stated in the AMF (2004), the AMF requires two interim and final 
publications of the companies’ results, the so-called interim and final publications. The former has to be published 
quarterly and includes at least the turnover. The later is a yearly bulletin that comprehends all the accounting 
results. Both are disclosed within the four months after the end of the accounting period and these dates are largely   11
Table 2 should be inserted here 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
Given that the research area related to this study is very wide-ranging, this survey does not 
pretend to be exhaustive
5. Although most of the previous literature indicates an immediate price 
reaction to information arrivals, there is a weak consensus about how market liquidity reacts to 
news announcements. Hence, in reviewing the literature, I focus my attention on two central 
questions: (1) whether a news announcement decreases market liquidity (i.e. larger spreads), 
and (2) the timing of the market reaction.  
Dann, Mayers, and Raab (1977), Patell and Wolfson (1984) and Jennings and Starks 
(1985) were among the first researchers to explore the markets’ reaction to new information 
using intraday data. They investigate whether the market is able to adjust in a timely manner. In 
general, they find that equity prices react within 15 minutes. 
The event study literature has mainly focused on earnings or dividend announcements. 
Morse and Ushman (1983) find no impact on the closing bid-ask spread size. Lee (1992) shows 
that in the pre-announcement period there is little evidence of abnormal volume and 
information leakage. Most of the announcement effect is absorbed in the half hour after the 
news release and this is manly driven by large trades. Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993) find a 
joint deterioration of spread and market depth in anticipation of earnings announcements. 
Spreads and quoted depths return to non-announcement levels after three hours. Greene and 
Watts (1996) find that diverse market structures (e.g. specialist versus dealer markets) 
                                                                                                                                                           
known in advance by traders. 
5 In particular, I will not survey the previous research on macroeconomic news announcements.   12
characterize the price discovery process differently. Graham, Koski, and Loewenstein (2003) 
compare the market impact of anticipated and unanticipated dividend announcements. They 
find larger volume, volatility and lower liquidity (larger spreads and thinner depth) before 
anticipated announcements. Afterward, trading volume remains high, but liquidity returns to its 
normal level. Prior to the unanticipated announcements, they find abnormal volume, but normal 
liquidity. Next, liquidity deteriorates for a short period. Adverse selection costs preceding the 
announcements are high, especially for the unexpected releases. 
Brooks, Patel, and Su (2003) and Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004) study some special 
cases of extreme price reactions. Brooks et al. (2003) find that the market needs more time to 
assimilate extreme information events such as plane crashes and plant explosions. Goldstein 
and Kavajecz (2004) analyze the liquidity provision around the NYSE halt in trading on 
October 27, 1997. They find that limit-order traders remain inactive (wider order book spread 
and a diminished depth) and that liquidity is provided by the specialists. 
 Another area of the literature focuses specifically on the estimation of the transaction-
cost components surrounding public information disclosures
6. Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) 
find no evidence of information asymmetry
7. Brooks (1994) finds that spreads appear 
significantly larger before earnings announcements only for medium-size firms. Krinsky and 
Lee (1996) show higher (lower) adverse selection costs (inventory holding and order processing 
costs) for the two days before and after earnings announcements. Affleck-Graves et al. (2002) 
find that an increase in adverse selection costs on the day prior to earnings announcements 
affect only NASDAQ firms with less predictable earnings. Jennings (1994) shows little 
evidence of informed trading before the takeover proposals announcement. 
                                                 
6 Daley, Hughes and Rayburn (1995) infer the adverse selection problem by estimating the permanent price impact 
and not the cost components. They show that block trades prior to earnings announcements convey more 
information, especially for small firms. 
7 Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) find some information asymmetry only in the special case when two successive   13
 
2.2 THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
This survey of theoretical models is very broad. I will only refer to few influential papers 
and expressly omit many other important contributions. The traditional view of asymmetric 
information models implies a decreasing effect of information asymmetry after new releases
8. 
These models imply that liquidity provision deteriorates (widen spread and lower depth) prior 
to scheduled news announcements. In case of unanticipated announcements, uninformed traders 
should provide normal liquidity to the market unless they detect information-motivated traders. 
After the announcement, liquidity should return to normal soon after the new information is 
processed by the market. Price volatility is associated with the revisions of investors' beliefs. It 
should remain high only for the duration of the adjustment process. Trading volume can be 
lower prior to information releases since discretionary liquidity traders may be hesitant to trade. 
Afterward, volume increases momentarily along with the pent-up demand and portfolio 
rebalancing. 
There are more recent works dedicated to limit-order book markets. A common attribute 
of these models is a dynamic view of liquidity provision that adapts to market conditions. In 
Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2005), patient traders dynamically respond to the conditions of 
the order book. They show that undercutting and overbidding strategies are attractive if the 
competition among limit-order traders is high. Handa, Schwartz and Tiwari (2003) show that 
the heterogeneity in traders' opinion leads the process of price discovery and liquidity 
provision. Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2005) analyze the equilibrium in a dynamic limit order 
book market in which rational liquidity traders choose optimal submission strategies. 
Obizhaeva and Wang (2005) develop a model for limit order book markets capturing the 
                                                                                                                                                           
earnings announcements are released within a few days of each other. 
8 Two representative works are Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O'Hara (1992).   14
dynamic nature of the liquidity supply and demand when the times of trade is endogenized and 
determined optimally.  
 
3. Order Flow Around News Arrivals 
The procedure to analyze the trading activity around the arrival of public news releases is 
divided into two steps. First, I perform my analysis on firm-by-firm basis. Each firm’s average 
value is then weighted equally in the sample mean. Thus, I calculate the average value of a 
given trading dimension for each firm.  I then calculate the cross-sectional average of this 
trading dimension across all the firms in my sample. Hence, no pooled average is used. This 
prevents me from any bias towards more liquid firms or firms with a larger number of 
information releases. 
I decompose the trading time around the exact moment of the news arrivals into 10-
minute intervals. A distinguishing feature of this decomposition method is that I split the pre 
and post-announcement periods exactly at the event time (for a similar approach see Graham et 
al., 2003). A time frame shorter than 10 minutes would presumably provide more precision in 
identifying the timing of the news impact. On the other hand, a longer time period allows me to 
minimize the influence of non-information effects, such as the bid-ask bounce. A 10-minute 
period represents a suitable compromise for this trade-off
9.  
For the trading activity, I calculate price changes, return volatility, trading volume, and 
intratrade time duration. Price changes are the logarithmic transaction price differences over 
10-minute intervals
10. I calculate realized return volatility by using the Ahn, Bae, and Chan 
                                                 
9 I tested other lengths of time intervals, in particular 5 or 15 minutes. The results remain essentially the same. 
10 One of the purposes of this research is to consider price discreteness. Consistently, I rather analyze transaction 
prices instead of mid-quote prices. However, using the mid-quote price, statistics and results remain essentially 
unchanged.    15
(2001) method, which squares the log price changes and sums up the square returns over the 
intraday intervals
11. Trading volume is the average number of shares exchanged in each 10-
minute period. The intratrade duration is the average time that elapses between the successive 
transactions over 10-minute periods.  
The order flow values are the order data in the book before the occurrence of any trade. 
Using the order data, I calculate the quoted bid-ask spread, market depth, and probability of 
trade continuation. As before, I perform a firm-by-firm analysis and then I average these 
measures across firms. I measure the spread as the difference between the prevailing ask and 
bid quotes. As in Lee et al. (1993), market depth is the sum of volumes pending at the best ask 
and bid quotes. I calculate the probability of trade continuation by using the frequency of two 
subsequent trades in the same direction, i.e. two successive buys or sells.  
The time window to analyze the announcement impact is composed of three 10-minute 
intervals before, and six 10-minute periods after the news release arrivals. I also considered 
larger periods of news impact. However, the 90-minute time window represents the appropriate 
length of time to account for the major intraday news impact. In the same spirit of Lee et al. 
(1993), the measures of news impact are expressed as a percentage deviation from the non-
event period average for the same firm and time of day. These standardized measures allow for 
comparisons across firms with their “normal” values. This method also provides a 
straightforward adjustment for intraday seasonalities. The test for comparing significant 
differences between announcement and non-announcement periods is based on the t-statistic.
12 
Table 3 should be inserted here 
 
                                                 
11 The use of the mid-quote price to calculate realized volatility conducts to the same results.  
12 Additional tests using the Wilcoxson-Mann-Whitney method confirm the results presented in this paper.     16
3.1 EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS VERSUS FIRM-SPECIFIC NEWS 
The first question I address is if the market reacts differently to real-time firm-specific news 
and earnings announcements. By comparing Panels A and B in Table 3, three main results 
emerge. First, earnings announcements have a larger market impact. This impact results in 
larger price changes, volatility, trading volume (in size and number of trades). This finding 
suggests that earnings announcements convey more information than the average real-time 
news item. Second, earnings announcements have a more persistent effect. An explanation 
could be that an earnings announcement includes a broad information set that typically implies 
a time-consuming analysis
13. Third, market liquidity deteriorates around earnings 
announcements, i.e. the spread is larger and depth is thinner. Conversely, the arrival of a typical 
firm-specific news release is associated with a tight spread and normal or larger depth. This 
interesting result deserves further discussion.  
A larger spread around earnings announcements is consistent with the previous empirical 
literature
14 and theoretical models linking public information releases with asymmetric 
information risk (e.g. Kim and Verrecchia, 1994
15; and the class of asymmetric information 
models discussed above). Instead, a tighter spread around real-time news arrivals may appear at 
odds with that literature. But there are at least three arguments supporting a possible increase in 
liquidity in response to information releases. First, the adverse selection problem goes hand in 
hand with the information content of the news bulletin. Earnings announcements typically 
convey a more informative communication that lends itself to a higher information asymmetry 
risk. In this respect, arguments of the traditional asymmetric information models hold. On the 
                                                 
13 All the Reuters’ earnings announcements enclose tables about accounting information (balance sheet, income 
and cash flows statements, etc.). 
14 See e.g. Gajewski (1999) finds larger spreads after earnings announcements at the Paris Bourse. 
15 In Kim and Verrecchia (1994), there is an essential distinction between adverse selection before and after the 
event as a result of different processing of the announcement.   17
other hand, the typical real-time news delivers a lower information content and little adverse 
selection. 
Second, the liquidity improvement around some news announcements can be due to a 
high level of competition among liquidity providers. This argument calls to mind the recent 
theoretical models discussed above. The competitive pressure in Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel 
(2005) implies small spreads and a fast mean reversion of the spread towards its normal size. 
The findings in Panel A of table 3 largely support this view. In the spirit of Handa, Schwartz 
and Tiwari (2003), earnings announcements that contain large information contents trigger a 
well-defined price adjustment, larger spreads and volatility. In contrast, regular real-time alerts 
do not cause a marked divergence of opinion. This implies a weaker price reaction along with 
in an improvement of market liquidity. Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2005) shows that volatility 
(on the true asset value) encourages competition among limit order submitters, regardless of 
whether they risk to being picked off by informed traders. This leads to more aggressive limit 
order submission and lower transaction costs. 
Finally, most of the existing literature examines particular information disclosures that 
typically have a large price impact, e.g. earnings announcements (e.g. Lee et al., 1993), 
macroeconomic news announcements (e.g. Greene, 2004
16) or completely unanticipated events 
(e.g. Brooks et al., 2003). In this paper, I analyze a wider definition of firm-specific news that is 
disseminated in real-time and displayed on traders’ screens in order to attract their attention. 
Foucault, Roell, and Sandås (2003) feature two important aspects in their model. First, costly 
monitoring motivates liquidity providers to constantly monitor the information flow and update 
quotes immediately. Second, costly monitoring coupled with competitive pressure among 
liquidity providers forces dealers to quote narrower bid-ask spreads and to quickly update their 
                                                 
16 Greene (2004) represents an important antecedent to this paper. He also measures the cost components on the 
basis of Madhavan et al. (1997) but he studies the macroeconomics news impact on the bond market.   18
quote. They show that these incentives strengthen  when limit-order traders anticipate 
information events. 
 
3.2 PRICE DYNAMICS 
A relevant question is whether information disclosures have a significant price impact. Table 3 
shows that earnings announcements originate a significant price impact at least 40 minutes after 
the news release. The price impact is observable in terms of absolute price change and return 
volatility. Excluding earnings announcements from the entire flow of real-time firm-specific 
news, there is evidence of price impact only in terms of return volatility rather than absolute 
price change. In Kim and Verrecchia (1994), the variance of price change increases with the 
diversity among information processors and with the number of liquidity traders, and it 
decreases with the precision of the public information and the processing information cost. 
From this perspective, the increase in volatility after the news arrival may suggest a moderate 
precision of the public information and that traders need time to interpret the information 
contents. 
It is worth emphasizing that significant price movements are already observable 10 
minutes before the Reuters’ earnings announcements
17. There are two possible explanations for 
this. First, there are many information sources and channels
18; Reuters is only one of them. 
Reuters might not be the first information provider to release a given news item. Hence, at the 
time of Reuters’ announcement, the information might already be partially known by the 
market participants. Second, some traders either trade on rumors or are better informed than 
                                                 
17 This premature market reaction is still observable when slightly different time windows are considered, e.g. 
delaying the release time by 30 seconds. 
18 Other information sources are television, telephones, emails or direct competitors of Reuters (e.g. Bloomberg or 
Telekurs). See e.g. the original study of Busse and Green (2002) on stock price reaction to television financial 
news reports broadcasted by the CNBC channel.   19
others. The evidence of price movements before the news arrival time suggests that traders have 
heterogeneous information sets. Ederington and Lee (1995) argue that the complete information 
of a news announcement only reaches the market gradually. Complete information in a report 
may not be available immediately. These arguments may explain a protracted process of price 
adjustment. 
 
3.3 TRADING VOLUME 
The demand for immediate execution increases around public information arrivals. I observe 
this evidence both in terms of the number of trades and trading volume size. Consistent with the 
previous literature (e.g. Graham et al., 2003; Krinsky and Lee, 1996), intense trading lasts 
around 30-40 minutes for earnings announcements. This length of time suggests that market 
participants need longer to rebalance their portfolio, satisfy their pent-up demand or adjust their 
hedging positions.  
Table 3 shows that the intratrade duration shortens, suggesting that traders expect less 
time needed to execute. A significantly faster trading is already observable 10 minutes before 
earnings announcements and it lasts for 40 minutes afterwards. A similar pattern holds for 
trading volume. These results are consistent with the empirical evidence on the US stock 
markets (e.g. Lee, 1992).  
Table 3 also shows that the autocorrelation of the trade direction increases around public 
information arrivals, especially for earnings announcements. Patell and Wolfson (1984) find a 
similar result. These findings support the argument in Bias, Hillion, and Spatt (1995), who 
argue that traders react similarly, but successively, to the same events. Higher trade 
continuation is another signal that the price adjustment follows an ongoing revision process. 
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3.4 EXTREME PRICE CHANGES 
In this part of my study, I examine if and how a limit-order book market is able to support 
extreme news. To do this, I focus only on those information arrivals that give rise to extreme 
price changes. I rank news arrivals by the size of the price change from 10 minutes before the 
news release up to the time of news release as reported by the Returns alert system
19. I then 
divide the price changes distribution into 20 equal, ordered subgroups, i.e. 20 quantiles or 
vintiles. Each vintile is composed of 194 news arrivals. The first (last) vintile represents the 
lowest (highest) price adjustments to information arrivals. Heuristically, I can interpret the 
news bulletins related to the first (last) vintile as the worst (best) firm-specific news items 
released during the sample period. Of course, the realized price impact cannot be used to know 
a priori whether the piece of news is economically relevant. It can only be used as an ex post 
measure to infer if the news item was unanticipated. 
As in Table 3, Tables 4 and 5 report the cross-sectional average values of the following 
trading dimensions: price change size, return volatility, trading volume, market depth, 
intratrade waiting time, quoted spread, frequency of buys and probability of trade continuation. 
Since the sign of the price change is considered in Tables 4 and 5, the following trading 
dimensions are also analyzed: the logarithmic change from the best ask (bid) quote to the best 
ask (bid) quote 10 minutes after (in other terms, the ask-to-ask and bid-to-bid quote changes 
over the 10-minute intervals), and average values of the cumulated orders pending on the 
prevailing ask and bid quotes (market depth at the sell and buy side of the order book). As 
before, the measures of news impact are expressed as a percentage deviation from the non-
event period average for the same firm and time of day. The only exceptions are represented by 
the measures of price impact. For the sake of clarity, price changes, bid-to-bid, and ask-to-ask 
                                                 
19 I also analyzed an alternative method. I ranked news impacts by ranking price changes from the time of the 
news arrival to 10 minutes afterwards. This alternative leads to essentially the same results. The main advantage of   21
quotes changes are expressed as the difference between announcement and non-announcement 
values in basis points. 
Table 4 shows the market dynamics conditional on the price impact of real-time news 
arrivals. The size of price changes indicates that price movements in the first and last vintile 
represent considerable price disruptions, i.e. around 40 basis points over a 10-minute period of 
time
20. The main findings in Table 4 are that the size of the price change at the time of a news 
arrival increases with the return volatility, trade frequency, trading volume, bid-ask spread size, 
and ask-to-ask and bid-to-bid quote changes. Price drops (jumps) are associated with larger bid-
to-bid (ask-to-ask) quote changes, and with a higher proportion of sells (buys). As in Graham et 
al. (2003) and Jennings (1994), less clear patterns link price changes with quoted depth. Market 
depth seems to be thicker when the market is calm or extremely turbulent, i.e. when price 
changes are relatively moderate (from the 5
th to the 15





th vintiles). One may question if these extreme price disruptions are 
real news effects or just price move effects. To verify this, I construct a control sample for the 
same firm and time of day but over non-event days. I randomly pick these returns and then sort 
them by price change size (in vintiles). This additional test (not tabulated) shows that news-
driven returns are markedly different from systematic price moves. 
Table 4 should be inserted here 
Table 5 analyzes the first and last vintiles of the price changes distribution reported in 
Table 4 in more detail. Table 5 gives additional information on the history of these extreme 
movements, in particular the market dynamics during the 90-minute time window around news 
releases. It is worth emphasizing that there is no price adjustment before news releases causing 
severe price changes. This price stability suggests that, although the release time of these news 
                                                                                                                                                           
the method I use in this study is that it captures the initial impact of the news arrival. 
20 No trading halts occurred during the sample period.   22
bulletins may be anticipated, their information contents are essentially unexpected.  
Table 5 shows that volatility during extreme price changes is more than 100% the normal 
level. Volatility is higher before news releases and tends to decrease afterwards, even if it 
remains high. As in Brooks et al. (2003), a persistently high level of volatility suggests that the 
market needs more time to absorb extreme news. As observed for earnings announcements, 
there is a positive relation between price volatility and spread size. This further supports the 
idea that only announcements containing important information increase both volatility and 
spreads. 
Table 5 should be inserted here 
It is noteworthy that a greater demand for liquidity, rather than a weak liquidity supply, is 
associated with extreme price changes. The large number of trades executed and shares 
exchanged within a very short time supports this assertion. I also note that large trading volume 
consumes liquidity already 30 minutes before the news release. On the other hand, market 
depth on both sides of the order book remains in line with its normal value. This evidence 
suggests that liquidity provision is sufficient if regarded in absolute terms, but insufficient 
relative to an abnormal, transient liquidity demand. Put differently, extreme price changes are 
not due to a deficient provision of market liquidity and, therefore, they cannot be considered 
endogenous. 
I gain insights from the short-term dynamics of the bid and ask quotes. The spread size is 
more than 30% larger than normal when the market experienced the largest price movements. 
The dynamics of the bid and ask quote changes show that the spread enlargement is not due to 
stale orders pending on one side of the order book. In fact, both sides are actively updated and 
consistently follow the direction of the price adjustment. However, during a steep price increase 
(decrease), the ask (bid) quote increases (decreases) more than bid (ask) quote. Therefore,   23
extreme price movements depend mainly on the elevated trading aggressiveness of one side of 
the book, and not on the traders’ reluctance to provide liquidity on the opposite side of the 
book. The thickness of the buy and sell sides seems to support this assertion. In fact, price 
jumps (drops) are associated with a normal or even thicker sell side (buy side) of the book. This 
evidence is consistent with Parlour (1998) who shows that in a competitive environment, 
liquidity supply provides higher market depth to the most aggressive side of market. 
The final indication in Table 5 is that there is a small price rebound after a price 
disruption. One could expect a large positive (negative) price rebound after a price drop (jump) 
because of a large bid-ask spread. On the contrary, Table 5 shows that the reverse price 
movement is rather small. This is another sign of high liquidity provision by limit-order 
submitters who promptly fill a wide bid-ask spread. 
 
4. Price Formation Models and Cost Components Estimation 
The second main objective of my research is to estimate the transaction-cost components 
surrounding the public information arrivals. To do this, I use an autoregressive model (hereafter 
AR model) for modeling the price formation behavior. The AR model is a generalization of the 
Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) model (hereafter MRR model). The main features 
of the MRR model are that the change in the true value of an asset from t-1 to t can be due to a 
non-trading event, such as the arrival of new public information, or a trading event, such as an 
innovation in the order flow. The arrival of new public information is associated with a public 
news announcement represented by the i.i.d. innovation  t u . For a trading event, the revision is 
due to the unexpected order flow. The true value changes in proportion to the deviation 
between expected order flow,  [] 1 t t x x E − , and the actual order flow,  t x . I call this proportion θ. 
It represents the degree of information asymmetry or the permanent impact of the order flow   24
innovation. Hence, the true value process can be expressed as: 
[] () t 1 t t t 1 t t u x x E x + − θ + µ = µ − −         ( 1 )  
The second main assumption in the MRR model is that the transaction price,  t p,  
corresponds to the efficient price plus a component that impounds various microstructure 
effects: 
() t t t t x p ε + φ + µ =           ( 2 )  
φ represents compensation for providing liquidity and includes any order processing 
costs.  φ can be interpreted as the liquidity provider's compensation for inventory risk and for 
any order processing costs, such as clearing or brokerage fees. Also,  t ε  denotes the i.i.d. 
residual term with mean zero that embodies the effect of stochastic rounding and errors induced 
by price discreteness. The residual terms in equations (1) and (2) are uncorrelated. 
The third main assumption in the MRR model is that the order flow follows a general 
Markov Chain process characterized by only a one-lag autocorrelation in the order flow. To 
illustrate this point, let us assume that a sell occurs at time t, and thus the transaction price is at 
the bid. The probability of order persistence, i.e. two subsequent buys or sells, is equal to δ  and 
the probability of reversal order is  δ − 1 . In this example, the probability that the trade in  1 t +  
occurs at the ask and at the bid is  δ − 1  and δ . Let λ represent the unconditional probability 
that the transaction price occurs within the spread, i.e.,  ( ) 0 x Pr t = . I can then express the order 
flow in a transition matrix P as follows: 
[]
() ()  
1
2 / 1 2 / 1
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=         ( 3 )  
Appendix 1 shows the property of the transition matrix P. I denote  () () λ − − δ = ρ 1 2 . The   25
conditional expectation of the trade direction at time  1 t + , given the trade direction in t, is: 
[]) x ( x x E t t 1 t ρ = +           ( 4 )  
Combining equations (1) and (2) with (4), the main estimation equation of the MRR 
model is: 
()( ) t 1 t t t x x p ξ + θρ + φ − θ + φ = ∆ −         ( 5 )  
where  1 t t t t u − ε − ε + = ξ  clusters all the residual terms of the true prices and the transaction 
prices. 
The crucial point in the MRR model is to assume only a one-lag autocorrelation in the 
order flow. Hasbrouck (1991) presents empirical evidence on lasting price and order dynamics. 
After comparing different models of transaction-cost components, de Jong, Nijman, and Röell 
(1996) conclude that a one-period empirical implementation underestimates the price effects of 
trading. Thus, I assume that the order flow follows a more general autoregressive process. 
Equation (4) can be generalized as follows: 
[] t
k
2 t 1 t t k t x ,... x , x , x x E ρ = − − +          ( 6 )  
See Appendix 1 for more details. Relaxing the MRR assumption that k is equal to 1, the 











ρ − θ + µ = µ ∑ − −         ( 7 )  
To find a straightforward representation of the estimation equation, I limit the 
autoregressive decaying impact of the order flow to two lags. This assumption is consistent 
with the finding in the empirical literature that the significant level in the autoregressive 
process of the trade indicator series achieves two or, at maximum, three lags. Equation (5) of 
the MRR model becomes:   26
()( ) t 2 t
2
1 t t t x x x p ξ + θ ρ − θρ + φ − θ + φ + α = ∆ − −       ( 8 )  
As before,  1 t t t t u − ζ − ζ + = ξ  clusters all the residual terms of the true price and the 
transaction price. The constant α represents the expected change in the asset value.  
The AR representation makes the price formation process more robust for the many 
microstructure imperfections that engender lagged effects. In fact, the literature provides 
evidence on price discreteness effects (e.g. Harris, 1994), inventory consequences (e.g. Stoll, 
1989), lasting adjustments to information (e.g. Patell and Wolfson, 1984), and other strategic 
behavioral effects, such as order-splitting strategy that induces dilutions in the price impacts or 
price smoothing effects. 
I estimate the AR model by applying the Ordered Probit technique
21. As in Hausman, Lo, 
and MacKinlay (1992), I divide the price change sizes into nine categories: when the price 
drops (jumps) four ticks or less (more), goes down (up) three ticks, down (up) two ticks, down 
(up) one tick, and, finally, when the price remains unchanged.  
Let  t p ~ ∆  be the unobservable continuous variable denoting the price changes from t-1 to t. 
The partition of the state space allows for mapping price changes in n discrete values. Hence, 
t p ∆  is the discrete dependent variable representing the observable price change value. 
Consistent with equation (8), let α be the constant and  i β  for i=1,2,3 be the coefficients related 
to the regressors  t x,   1 t x −  and  2 t x − . The expression of the Ordered Probit regression is as 
follows: 
t 2 t 3 1 t 2 t 1 t x x x p ~ ξ + β + β + β + α = ∆ − −         ( 9 )  
                                                 
21 See Hausman, Lo and MacKinlay (1992) for a more exhaustive discussion about the advantages of using the 
Ordered Probit approach to treat price discreteness.   27
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Equation (9) refers to the Probit regression in which  t ξ  is the independent and non-
identically distributed residual by characteristics of the Probit regression. To take 
heteroskedasticity into account, I use the Huber/White/sandwich robust method of calculating 
the variance-covariance matrix. Expression (10) shows the state-space partition and  ticks   4 − γ  to 
ticks   4 + γ  are the related thresholds that set the price change sizes in ticks. Assuming Gaussian 
residuals  t ξ , one can easily obtain the conditional distribution of  t p ~ ∆ .  
The Probit analysis is performed on a firm-by-firm basis. Therefore, results in Tables 6 
and 7 are averaged values across the 30 regressions. Table 6 shows the main statistics of the 
Ordered Probit regression and confirms the statistical significance of all the explanatory 
variables but the constant. Hence, both the first and second lags in the order flow are relevant in 
the price formation process. The Chi-squared statistics in Panel B of Table 6 provides a test for 
the likelihood ratio about the restrictions that the cost components are the same before and after 
the news arrivals. These statistics suggest that the cost components are essentially the same 
before and after any news release. In contrast, the transaction-cost components differ 
significantly before and after news arrivals that cause extreme price changes. The related P-
value for the likelihood ratio test is 0.001 (0.032) when news announcements cause price drops 
(jumps). In the following section, these findings will be discussed further. 
Table 6 should be inserted here 
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5. Empirical Findings on Transaction-Cost Components 
5.1 TRANSACTION-COST COMPONENTS IN THE PARIS BOURSE 
The estimates in Panel A of Table 7 show the existence of adverse selection cost, order 
processing cost, and order persistence in limit-order book markets. The order processing cost is 
the largest cost component. Adverse selection and order persistence components are smaller, 
but significant.  
Table 7 should be inserted here 
Table 7 shows that the average estimates that I derive from the AR model of the adverse 
selection cost, order processing, and order persistence are 0.41, 0.56, and 0.25 respectively. The 
monetary values of the cost components are €0.066, €0.090, and €0.039 respectively. To obtain 
the average monetary values (in €), I calculate the proportion of the cost components with 
respect to the quoted spread. The AR model provides estimates of transaction-cost components 
consistent with the previous literature on the NYSE and other international markets.
22 
 
5.2 TRANSACTION-COST COMPONENTS AND NEWS ARRIVALS 
The estimation of the cost components around public information arrivals provides me with 
straightforward proxies of transaction-cost components over those intraday periods that are 
characterized by uncertainty on the asset values. Panel B in Table 7 shows the estimates of the 
cost components conditional on information events. Using piecewise dummy variables, I 
estimate the transaction-cost components in the two 30-minute time intervals before and after 
the public information arrivals. Equation (9) is transformed as follows: 
                                                 
22 For the NYSE, see Stoll (1989) and Huang and Stoll (1997); for the Paris Bourse, see Declerck (2002) and de 
Jong, Nijman, and Röell (1996); for similar results on other limit-order book markets, see e.g. Brockman and 
Chung (1999) for the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and Sandås (2001) for Stockholm Stock Exchange.   29
t
j
2 t j , 3 j , 3
j
1 t j , 2 j , 2
j
t j , 1 j , 1 j
j
j , 0 t x d x d x d d p ~ ξ + β + β + β + α = ∆ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ − −     (11) 
where j=1,2 refers to the two 30-minute intervals before and after the news arrival, and d0,j to 
d3,j are dummy variables equaling one if the trade occurs within the related time interval, 
otherwise zero.  
In Table 7, the first indication is that the adverse selection costs around information 
releases are generally lower than the normal value. This evidence suggests that order flow 
contains relatively little information and thus a lower risk of information asymmetry. Weak 
evidence of information leakage was also found in the previous literature (e.g. Ederington and 
Lee, 1995; Jennings, 1994; Lee, 1992).  
The order processing costs around public information arrivals are also lower than normal. 
These estimates are consistent with the descriptive analysis in Table 3 showing that the 
competitiveness in liquidity provision strengthens around the disclosure time. However, order 
processing costs tend to increase in post-announcement trading. This evidence supports the idea 
that liquidity suppliers demand higher compensation for providing liquidity during the price 
discovery process due to a new information release. 
Table 7 shows that public information arrivals produce higher order persistence costs. As 
shown in Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2005), order persistence may exist even in absence of 
asymmetric information. My finding is also consistent with those of Table 3 and the previous 
literature (e.g. Greene, 2004), thus showing a higher probability of trade continuation in the 
same direction after news releases.  
 
5.3 TRANSACTION-COST COMPONENTS AND EXTREME NEWS ARRIVALS 
The final analysis of this research is to estimate the cost components around only those public   30
information items that cause extreme price changes
23. As discussed above, these extreme 
movements can be heuristically thought of as the market’s response to news bulletins with a 
highly informative and unexpected content. I use dummy variables to recognize trades around 
news arrivals that engender price jumps and drops, as follows: 
t
k
2 t k , 3 k , 3
k
1 t k , 2 k , 2
k
t k , 1 k , 1 k
k
k , 0 t x d x d x d d p ~ ξ + β + β + β + α = ∆ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ − −     (12) 
where k=1,2 refers to the two 30-minute intervals before and after the news arrival. The dummy 
variables d0,j to d3,j identify the occurrence of a firm-specific news arrival that causes an 
extreme price impact. As before, extreme negative (positive) price changes correspond to the 
first (last) vintile of the price return distribution covering the time period from 10 minutes 
before the news announcement up until the news announcement (see Table 4). To analyze good 
and bad news separately, I repeat the regression procedure in equation (12) for the positive and 
negative price impacts. 
In Table 7, Panels C and D show the estimates of the cost components that are conditional 
on those information events that generate extreme negative (Panel C) and positive (Panel D) 
price impacts. Cost components around extreme movements differ from the same cost 
components around any information releases. Estimates both in Panels C and D suggest that 
adverse selection is higher before information disclosure, thus causing price disruptions. 
Adverse selection cost tends to decrease after the news has arrived. The findings are in line 
with the previous empirical findings (Brooks, 1994; Graham et al., 2003; Jennings, 1994; 
Krinsky and Lee, 1996) and theoretical models implying a decreasing effect of asymmetric 
information. 
The order processing cost has an opposing pattern. The order processing cost is lower 
                                                 
23 I do not examine the cost components around the specific case of earnings announcements since the 
characteristics of that sub-sample do not guarantee an exhaustive regression analysis.   31
than normal before extreme news arrivals and it increases afterwards. This evidence can be 
explained by the higher inventory costs after an information announcement implying agents' 
position revisions. Greene (2004) finds similar results. 
Table 7 also shows that after news arrivals, the order persistence component increases 
(decreases) when the price drops (jumps). As depicted in Table 5, this increase is probably due 
to the fact that after an extreme price drop, sells are still more likely to occur than buys, but 
after an extreme price jump, a reversal in trade direction typically occurs. 
 
6. Conclusion 
My research provides a descriptive analysis of the market behavior around real-time news 
release arrivals. Using the Reuters alert system, I collect six months of firm-specific news for 
30 highly liquid stocks quoted on the Paris Bourse. This data set represents the real-time 
information flow monitored by traders. Matching the news releases with the data on the 
intraday trading activity, I analyze the price discovery, liquidity provision, and transaction-cost 
components throughout the real-time information flow.  
As in the previous literature on dealer markets, I find that traders in limit order book 
markets actually monitor and promptly react to the real-time information flow. But this is true 
not only for those traders who promptly process new information into prices. It is also true for 
limit-order traders who provide liquidity on a voluntary basis. In a competitive environment, 
limit-order traders normally respond to news release arrivals by supplying a significant level of 
liquidity. In fact, the spread is tighter and the market depth at the best quotes is thick. Market 
depth, trade frequency, and spread tightness are highest in the few minutes surrounding news 
release arrivals. However, if I analyze only public information arrivals that cause unanticipated 
extreme price disruption such as earnings announcements, I get a very different picture. I find   32
that news bulletins with the largest price impact enlarge spreads, return volatility, and trading 
volume. In contrast, market depth remains in line with normal values. This finding suggests that 
limit-order traders provide sufficient liquidity if regarded in absolute terms, but insufficient 
relative to a temporary extraordinary demand for liquidity. 
Second, I develop a price formation model to analyze the transaction-cost components. 
My results, which support earlier studies, show that the order processing cost is the largest cost 
component. Adverse selection and the order persistence components are smaller, but 
significant. 
Finally, I analyze the cost components around the public information disclosure. The 
adverse selection cost component appears to be lower than normal. This evidence suggests that 
asymmetric information is only weakly relevant to the disclosure impact. Order processing 
costs are also smaller. This result provides further evidence on the high degree of 
competitiveness in liquidity provision. However, conditioning the estimation of cost 
components only to those public information arrivals that cause severe price impacts, I see a 
different picture. Extreme price movements are preceded by higher adverse selection costs and 
order persistence, and lower order processing costs. After extreme news arrivals, adverse 
selection tends to decrease and order processing cost to increase in line with the traditional 
view of asymmetric information models. 
My study provides empirical evidence on the market quality of limit-order book markets. 
It shows that there is a dynamic relation between order and information flows. It also shows 
that a market structure based on voluntary liquidity provision is able to supply additional 
liquidity exactly when necessary, i.e. around information events. Even when news arrivals 
cause severe price disruptions, liquidity provision remains high and adverse selection and order 
processing costs quickly revert to their normal value.   33
Appendix 1: Specifications for the AR model 
The occupancy probability matrix at time t of the transition matrix  t P  has the property 


















Ps            (A.1) 
I calculate the steady state variance of  t x a s   ( ) ( ) λ − = 1 x Var t  and the covariance and the 
correlation between  t x  and  1 t x −  as, respectively: 
() [ ] () ( ) ( ) λ − − δ λ − = = − − 1 2 1 x x E x , x Cov 1 t t 1 t t        (A.2) 
()( ) ρ = λ − − δ = − 1 2 x , x Corr 1 t t          (A.3) 
The covariance in (A.2) and the correlation in (A.3) can be also expressed as: 
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) λ − − δ λ − = ∑∑ = − − − −
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Accordingly, the lagged covariance and correlation are: 
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2 t 1 t t k t x ,... x , x , x x E ρ = − − +          (A.8)  34
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Table 1 
Description of the Sample 
For each stock, the table shows company name (in “Name” column), market capitalization in millions of € 
(“MktCap”) in September 1999, price change over the sample period from April to September 1999 (“Price 
Change”), average daily number of trades (“Daily Trades”), average trade size in number of shares (“Volume”), 
average transaction price in € (“Price”) through the sample period, quoted spread as the difference between the ask 
and bid quotes (“Quoted Spread”), and percentage quoted spread (quoted spread divided by the mid-quote price) 
(“PQS”). The table also reports the total number of firm-specific news releases by the Reuters news alert system 
(in “All News” column). The total number of news items is the sum of the news items that are strictly firm-specific 
(“Firm News”) and index-related news (“Index News”). The index-related news refers primarily to the CAC 40 
index. The “Time E. A.” column shows exact time stamp (day/month; hour:minute) of the Reuters news alert on 
the company’s earnings announcements in 1999 analyzed in this study. 
 












Time E. A. 
Accor  8830  -6%  564  144  232.4  0.424  0.170  11  34  45  30/3 4:08 pm
Agf  9928  4%  346  325  48.2  0.082  0.166  6  71  77  16/9 2:06 pm
Air Liquid  13771  3%  766  216  147.2  0.282  0.196  16  75  91  28/4 10:58 am
Alcatel  45307  9%  1360  758  119.8  0.204  0.158  41  130  171  9/9 11:19 am 
Axa  48925  -7%  1199  945  120.0  0.178  0.145  22  283  305  19/4 1:33 pm
BNP  41204  -6% 962 891 77.7  0.129  0.127  120 446 566  6/5  4:12  pm 
Canal +  18142  -16%  443  206  176.4  0.455  0.255  41  142  183  30/3 11:43 am
Cap Gemini  19521  -4%  762  344  151.8  0.276  0.176  37  42  79  6/7 4:45 pm 
Ccf  9072  43%  415  269  105.5  0.263  0.251  35  83  118  15/9 4:05 pm
Dexia  6609  8%  444  127  127.3  0.252  0.189  5  31  36  6/4 9:16 am 
Elf Aquit.  42359  34%  1296  961  140.8  0.230  0.149  125  552  677  13/8 10:17 am
Eridania  2771 -15%  321  50  131.6 0.344 0.254  6  34  40 28/4  3:07  pm
France Tel.  134532  4%  2097  1643  73.5  0.099  0.134  111  422  533  15/9 4:30 pm
Danone  17171  6%  667  226  247.2  0.330  0.129  10  60  70  13/4 4:49 pm
Lagardere  6610  38% 526 522 36.6  0.079  0.216 26  72  98  11/5  4:34  pm
Legrand  5985  11%  294  45  209.3  0.575  0.269  5  7  12  20/4 12:08 pm
LVMH  43556  18%  693  225  259.9  0.437  0.158  23  165  188  17/9 9:38 am 
Michelin  5254 8%  568 460 42.5  0.089  0.191 15  45  60  8/9  4:16  pm 
L’Oreal  53848  6%  723  109  610.3  1.050  0.163  7  20  27  8/4 9:16 am 
Peugeot  10249  37%  494  230  159.3  0.283  0.188  29  87  116  7/9 11:40 am 
Pinault  31156  16%  604  234  157.2  0.343  0.203  10  86  96  15/9 4:10 pm
Promodes  20502  48% 416  56 662.5  1.219  0.176 21  123 144  4/8  4:36  pm 
Renault  11477  53% 962 906 41.3  0.070  0.183 57  213 270  2/9  4:09  pm 
Saint Gobain  16272  20%  672  274  158.6  0.315  0.187  16  31  47  22/7 4:46 pm
Sodexho  5885 5%  491  94 154.8  0.382  0.236 10  9  19  7/4  11:32  am 
Stmicro  44112  -9% 684 547 94.5  0.205  0.211 75  68  143  19/7  9:35  am 
Thomson  5500  17% 319 254 32.2  0.100  0.305 19  78  97  15/9  1:22  pm
Total Fina  95552  4%  1057  1166  120.8  0.179  0.143  106  421  527  18/5 9:53 am 
Usinor  4536  6%  574  1375  14.1  0.036  0.257  7  49  56  8/4 1:33 pm 
Valeo  6341  -7% 455 229 77.7  0.193  0.239 19  19  38  31/8  4:06  pm
Mean 26166  11%  706  461  157.7  0.304  0.194  34  130  164 
StDev 29361  18%  388  424  145.0  0.262  0.046  36  146  179 
   38
Table 2 
News Releases on France Telecom on April 21, 1999 
The table shows a typical intraday news bulletin provided by the Reuters 2000 News Alert System. The Time and 
Date columns show the intraday time stamp and date of the news item arrivals. The Headline column reports the 
news headlines. The fourth column, “Type of News Item” indicates whether the news is index-related (“IRN”) or 
firm-specific news (“FSN”). 
 
 
Time Date  Headline  Type  of 
News Item
9:15 AM  21-Apr-99 RTRS-Paris CAC opens up, but Dow jitters dampen trade  IRN 
10:05 AM  21-Apr-99 RTRS-Italy govt talking to Crediop as cell phone adviser  FSN 
10:37 AM  21-Apr-99 RTRS-Mannesmann <MMNG.F> sees little risk of takeover bid  FSN 
11:04 AM  21-Apr-99 RTRS-Paris CAC holds early gains in thin, jumpy trade  IRN 
1:53 PM  21-Apr-99 RTRS-Spain's Airtel says intends to stay independent  FSN 
2:13 PM  21-Apr-99 RTRS-Firms identified to break Internet naming monopoly  FSN 
3:04 PM  21-Apr-99 RTRS-Cegetel fixed line subscribers pass one million  FSN 
4:14 PM  21-Apr-99 RTRS-Paris CAC closes up but volumes thin on Dow worry  IRN 
4:28 PM  21-Apr-99 RTRS-TPSA <TPSAs.WA> firm needs 6 months to build GSM net  FSN 
4:36 PM  21-Apr-99 RTRS-ADR REPORT -Emerging market highlights- April 21  FSN 
4:59 PM  21-Apr-99 RTRS-BT's Valiance sees EU scrutiny of Telekom, Italia  FSN   39
Table 3 
Descriptive Analysis of the News Impacts 
The table shows the trading dynamics around public information releases. The analysis has been performed on a 
firm-by-firm basis. This table shows the average values across the 30-firm sample. Measures of news impact are 
expressed as the percentage deviation from the nonevent period average for the same firm and time of day. I 
analyze the market reaction over nine 10-minute time intervals, from 30 minutes before to 60 minutes after the 
exact moment of the news release (“Periods”). The table reports the absolute values of the price change from the 
beginning and the end of the 10-minute interval in % (“Abs. Price Change”), realized return volatility as the sum 
of squared price changes over the time interval in % (“Realized Volatility”), average volume in number of shares 
traded over the time interval (“Volume”), market depth as the sum of the order volume pending at the best bid and 
ask quotes (“Depth”), average time in seconds that elapses between successive transactions (“Trade Wait”), quoted 
spread as the difference between the best bid and ask quotes (“Spread”), and the probability of trade continuation 
as the frequencies that two successive trades have the same direction (“Prob. Contin.”). The column titled “No. of 
Obs” shows the total number of observations. Panel A shows the impact of the real-time firm-specific news flow 
excluding earnings announcements. In Panel B, I consider only earnings announcements. I calculate the two-tailed 
student's t-test to test significant announcement values. ** (*) indicates a significance level at 1% (5%). 
 
Panel A: Market Reaction to the Real-Time Firm-Specific News Flow Excluding Earnings Announcements 









-30/-20  1.10 1.01 2.75 2.82 -5.50  -3.79 0.79  52724 
-20/-10  2.46 3.62 3.18 3.16 -6.62  -6.06 0.71  58445 
-10/0 4.01 5.08 4.79 6.82  -12.57  -7.51 0.78  71014 
news/+10  5.64 14.61* 6.43 12.25*  -19.30*  -8.81* -0.20 98888 
+10/+20 4.91  14.04 13.58* 9.73* -18.95* -7.03  0.49  67310 
+20/+30  3.99  5.29 14.71* 6.41 -13.81*  -9.36* 0.90 66381 
+30/+40 3.95  1.80  12.28 10.14* -11.44  -6.42  2.70  62178 
+40/+50  3.24 2.35 6.96 5.59 -9.28  -4.48  -0.84  60342 
+50/+60  1.75 1.43 0.54 3.88 -6.14  -2.49 0.58  58884 
 
Panel B: Market Reaction to Earnings Announcements 









-30/-20  2.15 -1.39 -3.59 4.26 -5.87 7.20 0.91  519 
-20/-10  4.15 3.56  14.65*  2.46 -7.63 7.82 -3.25 692 
-10/0  28.05** 23.10* 20.65**  6.75  -8.46  11.12*  4.77*  697 
news/+10  29.38**  30.15** 16.77* 13.90* -17.96* 16.46*  3.86*  1000 
+10/+20 15.87*  20.72*  8.52  -0.52  -20.97* 12.23*  3.76*  643 
+20/+30 16.64*  18.66*  10.78 -22.31**  -29.53**  6.38  3.52*  503 
+30/+40 11.38*  20.23*  2.71  -5.72  -13.25  4.48  4.14*  497 
+40/+50  7.47 12.91 1.69 -7.28*  -11.40*  3.14  0.24  492 




Descriptive Analysis of the News Impact Ranked by Price Change Size 
This table describes the news impact ranked by price change size divided in 20 quintiles (vintiles). The analysis 
has been performed on a firm-by-firm basis. First, for each firm I calculate transaction price changes from 10 
minutes before to the exact moment of the news arrival. Then, I divide the price changes distribution into vintiles. 
This table reports the average values across the 30-firm sample for each vintile. Measures of news impact are the 
deviation values from the nonevent period average for the same firm and time of day. This table shows the 
transaction price change over the 10-minute intervals (“Price Change”), return volatility as the sum of squared 
price changes over the time interval (“Volat.”), average volume in number of shares (“Volume”), market depth as 
the sum of the order volume pending at the best bid and ask quotes (“Depth”), average time in seconds between 
successive trades (“Trade Wait”), quoted spread (“Spread”), bid-to-bid (ask-to-ask) quotes change over 10-minute 
intervals (“Bid-to-Bid” and “Ask-to-Ask”), average order volume pending at the best bid (ask) quotes (“Depth 
Bid” and “Depth Ask”), the probability of trade continuation as the frequencies that two successive trades have the 
same direction (“Prob. Contin.”), and frequency of a buy (“Prob. of Buys.”). Price change, bid-to-bid and ask-to-
ask quotes changes are expressed in basis points. All the other measures of news impact are the percentage 
deviation from non-announcement values. I calculate the two-tailed student's t-test to test significant 
announcement values. ** (*) indicates a significance level at 1% (5%). 
 




















1  -0.37**  100.9**  37.4** 11.6* -32.1** 28.1** -0.29** -0.26** 15.8** 7.6*  8.1** -17.6**
2 -0.20**  24.9*  25.4** 0.1 -17.5* 6.8 -0.17* -0.16* 1.0  0.7  7.4*  -15.6*
3 -0.14*  37.6**  -2.9 -2.5  -12.0 1.4 -0.10  -0.10  -2.2 0.9  1.2  -14.5*
4  -0.11*  -12.2 3.0  -2.6 -11.5 -5.8 -0.08  -0.09 1.5  -5.9 6.1* -10.4 
5  -0.08 -7.5 16.0* 7.8*  -15.1* -6.7 -0.05  -0.05 2.9 12.1* -0.5  -13.4*
6  -0.06  -20.7* 7.9  5.1  -6.9  -7.8 -0.05 -0.06 9.5*  3.6  -1.7  -6.7 
7  -0.05  -25.2* -2.8 13.4* 2.5 -17.1* -0.03 -0.03  16.9** 9.5  -0.6  -8.9 
8  -0.03 -14.6* -5.2 19.2** -3.1 -24.1** -0.03 -0.03 11.9* 29.8*  -2.0  -10.9 
9 -0.01  -12.8  -7.8 6.2 -9.4  -27.1** -0.01  -0.02  9.2* 2.8 0.3  -10.8 
10 0.00  -33.3**  -12.3  5.3 -4.2  -23.2** 0.00  -0.01  12.7*  -1.2 0.2 -1.8 
11  0.00  -46.3**  -24.7**  1.1  3.7  -20.3** 0.00  -0.01 3.0  -1.0 5.1* -4.5 
12 0.01  -27.4*  6.4 -0.9  -10.2  -21.9** -0.01  0.00 0.2 -5.3 -0.1 -1.9 
13  0.03 -38.0** -11.5 14.7**  -6.2 -21.4** 0.04  0.03  13.8* 16.4**  -0.7  -4.7 
14  0.04 -23.3*  12.9*  20.3** -7.0 -15.5* 0.02  0.02 16.5** 28.2** -0.9  1.9 
15  0.06  -11.4 15.2*  20.6** -5.9 -14.6* 0.04  0.04 19.1** 22.3** -0.5  -3.4 
16 0.08  -10.7  7.7 -0.9  -11.8  -12.7* 0.05  0.05  -3.6 3.2 -0.7 4.1 
17 0.10*  -0.8 -1.4  5.9 -11.1 -4.7 0.08 0.07 3.6  1.4  -6.1  4.9 
18  0.14*  37.2**  2.5 0.0  -21.8* 6.4  0.08  0.07  -4.6 4.1 0.9 6.9 
19  0.19**  48.7**  7.9 3.1  -26.3** 8.2  0.15*  0.16*  4.6 2.2 1.8  7.4* 
20  0.39**  142.9**  30.2**  10.0*  -35.9** 31.4** 0.33** 0.34** 11.1*  8.7* 2.0 8.6* 
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Table 5 
Descriptive Analysis of the News Impacts Causing Extreme Price Changes 
This table shows a 90-minute history of those news items causing the extreme price changes. The analysis was 
performed on a firm-by-firm basis. To find extreme price changes, I calculate price changes first for each firm 
from 10 minutes before to the exact moment of the news arrival. Then, I divide the price changes distribution into 
20 quintiles (vintiles). Finally, I focus on the first and last vintile. The first (last) vintile represents those firm-
specific news items with the most positive (negative) price impact. This table shows the average values across the 
30-firm sample. Measures of news impact are the deviation values from the non-event period average for the same 
firm and time of day.  Panel A (B) reports price drops (jumps). I divide the 90-minute history into nine 10-minute 
intervals (“Periods”). The table shows the log price changes over the 10-minute intervals (“Price Change”), 
realized return volatility as the sum of squared price changes over the time interval (“Realized Volat.”), average 
volume in number of shares (“Volume”), market depth as the sum of order volume pending at the best bid and ask 
quotes (“Depth”), average time in seconds between successive trades (“Trade Wait”), quoted spread (“Spread”), 
logarithmic bid-to-bid (ask-to-ask) quotes change over 10-minute intervals (“Bid-to-Bid” and “Ask-to-Ask”), 
average order volume pending at the best bid (ask) quotes (“Depth Bid” and “Depth Ask”), probability of trade 
continuation as the frequencies that two successive trades have the same direction (“Prob. Contin.”), and 
frequency of a buy (“Prob. of Buys.”). Price change, bid-to-bid and ask-to-ask quotes changes are expressed in 
basis points. All the other measures of news impact are the percentage deviation from non-announcement values. I 
calculate the two-tailed student's t-test to test significant announcement values. ** (*) indicates a significance level 
at 1% (5%). 
 



















-30/-20  0.03  84.8**  18.6* 8.2* -17.7* 14.2* 0.03  0.04  9.9*  5.9  -3.5  3.6 
-20/-10  0.08  91.9**  51.0** 4.4  -12.0 15.9* 0.06  0.06 11.3* -3.3  -3.3  2.3 
-10/0  -0.37** 100.9** 37.4**  11.6*  -32.1** 28.1** -0.29** -0.26** 15.8** 7.6*  8.1*  -17.6**
news/10  0.02  112.8**  34.0** -2.5 -18.4* 44.6** 0.00  -0.02 10.0*  -14.5** 4.3  -7.5* 
+10/20  0.01  81.6**  26.3** 0.0 -13.8* 21.6** 0.00 -0.03 8.9* -9.3*  1.8  -1.7 
+20/30  0.00  61.3**  22.6**  -5.0 -11.6  22.3** 0.02 0.01 -3.0 -7.6* -6.3  2.9 
+30/40 0.01 44.0**  14.0* 13.0*  -0.4  14.7* -0.01 -0.01 15.0** -4.2  -2.2  1.8 
+40/50  -0.03  37.3** 3.6  8.8*  6.2  16.5* 0.00 -0.02 10.8* 8.1*  1.5  -2.4 
+50/60  0.00  50.9** 8.6  5.1 -10.2 -0.3 -0.01  -0.01  14.3* -1.8  -0.3  -3.4 
 



















-30/-20  0.04  27.2**  26.2**  8.8*  -29.9** 7.2  0.02 0.02 8.5* 9.4*  2.1  1.4 
-20/-10  -0.03  68.3**  75.7**  -4.5  -26.0** 12.8*  -0.02  -0.01 0.7 -8.7* 2.0  -3.2 
-10/0  0.39**  142.9**  30.2**  10.0*  -35.9** 31.4** 0.33** 0.34** 11.1*  8.7* 4.2* 8.6* 
news/10  -0.04  131.7**  49.0**  8.8*  -31.7** 25.6** 0.00 -0.02  0.4 17.6** 0.1  1.8 
+10/20  0.07* 182.2** 16.2*  6.5  -26.6** 21.6** 0.05*  0.06*  5.9  7.9*  -3.1  3.9 
+20/30  0.01  68.8**  17.2* 8.3* -22.0* 18.6** 0.02  0.01  0.7 14.9** 1.7  3.8 
+30/40  -0.07*  28.2**  3.9 7.1* -7.3 0.7 -0.03  -0.05* 6.3 7.9* 1.8 -3.9 
+40/50  0.00 11.0 11.4  15.2**  -27.1* -3.6 0.01 0.01  18.4*  12.9* -0.9 -1.0 
+50/60  -0.01 13.0 14.8*  10.0* -14.3  1.2  0.00  0.01 11.0* 9.7*  1.2  2.3 
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Table 6 
Order Probit Regression for the Autoregressive (AR) Model 
Panel A of this table reports the average estimated coefficients from the Ordered Probit regression used to estimate 
the AR price formation model. The analysis has been performed on a firm-by-firm basis. This table reports the 
average coefficients and statistics across the 30-firm sample. The dependent variable is the trade-by-trade price 
change in tick size. I divide the price change sizes into nine categories: when the price drops (jumps) four ticks or 
less (more), when the price decreases (increases) by three ticks, two ticks, one tick, and when the price is 
unchanged. The explanatory variables are a constant, the trade indicator in t, t-1 and t-2. On the left-hand side, the 
estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables are α,  β1,  β2,  β3. In the column called “When News is 
Released”, I estimate the AR model around news arrivals. To do this, I use the dummy variables di,j, for i=0,1,2,3 
that refers to the respective coefficients, and for j=1 (j=2) if the trade occurs within 30 minutes before (after) the 
news arrival. In the column “When News Makes Price Drop (Jump)”, I estimate the AR model around extreme 
negative (positive) price changes. I analyze price drops and jumps separately. Once again, I use dummy variables, 
di,k. i=0,1,2,3 refer to the respective coefficients and k=1 (k=2) detects if the trade occurs 30 minutes before (after) 
a news release that cause an extreme price movement. The Ordered Probit regression also provides the estimated 
values for the limit points γn, for n=1,..8, those divide the nine categories of price change size. ** (*) indicates a 
significance level from the t-statistic at 1% (5%). Panel B shows the Chi-squared statistics and related p-values for 
the likelihood ratio (LR) test for assessing if the coefficients before and after news arrivals are significantly 
different.  
 
Panel A: Estimates from the AR model 
Unconditionally    When News Is Released  
When News Makes 
Price Drop   
When News Makes 
Price Jump 
Coefficient Estimate    Coefficient  Estimate    Coefficient Estimate    Coefficient Estimate 
α 0.015    α1 d0,1 0.013    α1 d0,1 0.001    α1 d0,1 0.004 
β1 0.981**    α2 d0,2 0.012    α2 d0,2 0.000    α2 d0,2 0.003 
β2 -0.661**    β1,1 d1,1 0.635**    β1,1 d1,1 0.914**    β1,1 d1,1 0.942** 
β3 -0.025**    β1,2 d1,2 0.633**    β1,2 d1,2 0.897**    β1,2 d1,2 0.928** 
     β2,1 d2,1 -0.449**   β2,1 d2,1 -0.600**   β2,1 d2,1 -0.637**
     β2,2 d2,2 -0.441**   β2,2 d2,2 -0.630**   β2,2 d2,2 -0.663**
     β3,1 d3,1 -0.019**   β3,1 d3,1 -0.032*   β3,1 d3,1 -0.029**
     β3,2 d3,2 -0.014**   β3,2 d3,2 -0.036**   β3,2 d3,2 -0.012* 
                  
Limit  Points                   
γ1 -2.289**    γ1 -1.631**   γ1 -2.119**   γ1 -2.313**
γ2 -1.984**    γ2 -1.395**   γ2 -1.870**   γ2 -2.038**
γ3 -1.586**    γ3 -1.100**   γ3 -1.488**   γ3 -1.648**
γ4 -1.003**    γ4 -0.698**   γ4 -0.932**   γ4 -1.068**
γ5 0.925**    γ5 0.668**    γ5 0.934**    γ5 0.853** 
γ6 1.524**    γ6 1.071**    γ6 1.506**    γ6 1.533** 
γ7 1.921**    γ7 1.362**    γ7 1.856**    γ7 1.950** 
γ8 2.239**    γ8 1.607**    γ8 2.110**    γ8 2.231** 
                  
Panel B: Test if coefficients are equal before and after news arrivals 
    When News Is Released  
When News Makes Price 
Drop  
When News Makes Price 
Jump 
     Chi-squared  LR  p-value   Chi-squared LR p-value   Chi-squared  LR p-value
     3.41  0.381    12.78  0.001    10.22  0.032 
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Table 7 
The Estimates of the Cost Components from the Autoregressive (AR) Model 
The table shows the estimates of the cost components that originate in the AR price formation model. The analysis 
has been performed on a firm-by-firm basis. This table reports the average cost components across the 30-firm 
sample. I analyze the cost components unconditionally and over two 30-minute time intervals, i.e. 30 minutes 
before and after news releases. The columns show estimates for adverse selection cost (“ASC”), order processing 
cost (“OPC”), and order persistence (“PERS”). Panel A shows the unconditional values of the estimated 
coefficients, i.e. the estimated coefficients using the entire sample. Panel B shows the estimated coefficients 
around real-time news arrivals. Panel C (D) shows the estimated coefficients around only those news arrivals that 
cause price drops (jumps). The table reports the average estimated coefficients (“Estimates”), the percentage of the 
cost components for the quoted spread (“In %”), and the average monetary value of the cost components (“In €”) 
calculated as the proportion of the quoted spread.  
 
Panel A: Unconditional Values  Panel B: Conditional on News Arrivals 
 Estimates  Estimates 
ASC  OPC PERS  ASC  OPC PERS 
0.422  0.559 0.243  30  min  before 0.255 0.380 0.272 
    30 min after  0.252  0.381  0.240 
      
 In %    In %   
ASC  OPC PERS  ASC  OPC PERS 
34%  46% 20%  30  min  before 28% 42% 30% 
    30 min after  29%  44%  27% 
      
 In €    In €   
ASC  OPC PERS  ASC  OPC PERS 
0.067  0.089 0.038  30  min  before 0.050 0.075 0.054 
    30 min after  0.052  0.078  0.049 
      
Panel C: News Arrivals Causing Price Drops  Panel D: News Arrivals Causing Price Jumps 
 Estimates  Estimates 
  ASC OPC  PERS  ASC OPC  PERS 
30 min before  0.432  0.482  0.273  30 min before  0.439  0.503  0.305 
30 min after  0.385  0.512  0.308  30 min after  0.327  0.601  0.191 
      
 In %    In %   
  ASC OPC PERS  ASC OPC PERS 
30 min before  36%  41%  23%  30 min before  35%  40%  24% 
30 min after  32%  42%  26%  30 min after  29%  54%  17% 
      
 In €    In €   
  ASC OPC PERS  ASC OPC PERS 
30 min before  0.099  0.110  0.062  30 min before  0.079  0.090  0.055 
30 min after  0.087  0.115  0.069  30 min after  0.065  0.120  0.038 
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Figure 1. Intraday Patterns of the Number of Trades and Return Volatility  
The graph illustrates the intraday patterns of two market dynamics that are the average number of trades (No. of 
Trades) and the return volatility (Volatility) over 30-minute time intervals. The analysis has been performed on a 
firm-by-firm basis. This table shows the average values across the 30-firm sample. The volatility is 10,000 times 
the sample average of the sum of all the squared price changes that occur over 30 minutes. The average number of 
trades is the average sample of the average number of transactions exchanged over 30 minutes. The trading day at 
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Figure 2. Intraday Patterns of Real-Time Information Releases  
The graph illustrates the rate of public news releases over 30-minute time intervals. I calculate the rate of public 
news releases as the relative frequency of the news released by the Reuters alert system. The graph shows three 
intraday patterns. The “Index News” curve denotes the index-related news, i.e. news that primarily refers to the 
CAC 40 index. The “Firm News” curve denotes the news that is strictly firm-specific. The trading day at the Paris 
Bourse is 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. The “Earnings News” refers to earnings announcements. The graph also shows 
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